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<title>Features from Asharq Alawsat English Edition </title>
<link>http://www.aawsat.com/english</link>
<description>Asharq Alawsat English Edition is your insight into the Middle East</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<copyright>&#169; 2012 Saudi Research and Publishing</copyright>
<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>asharq-e.com</title>
<link>http://www.aawsat.com/english</link>
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<description>Asharq-e delivers up-to-the-minute news and information on the latest stories, weather, entertainment, politics in the Middle East</description>
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<title>A Talk with Egypt Grand Mufti Dr. Ali Gomaa</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32998</link>
<description>
Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;The Egyptian political situation remains extremely delicate with the recently announced presidential elections, continued anti-Mursi protests, and ailing economic indicators. In an effort to mitigate these conditions, influential religious figures such as Dr. Ali Gomaa have been calling on the people of Egypt to unite for the good of the country, and to distance themselves from this atmosphere of tension and discord.
Dr. Ali Gomaa is the Grand Mufti of Egypt, a position he has held since 2003. As part of his role, he presides over the Dar Al-Ifta Al-Masriyyah, a prestigious Islamic research institution that issues fatwas and aims to keep contemporary Muslims in touch with religious principles. Dr. Gomaa is also a member of Al-Azhar&#8217;s Senior Scholars Council and is considered among the top fifty most influential Muslims in the world. In July 2011 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from Liverpool Hope University in recognition of his efforts as a major international figure promoting tolerance and understanding between religions.
The Grand Mufti of Egypt met with Asharq Al-Awsat at the headquarters of the Dar Al-Ifta in El-Darrasa, Cairo.
The following is the full text of the interview:
Q: Al-Azhar&#8217;s Dar Al-Ifta, under your administration, has witnessed considerable development. Is there anything you wanted to achieve but were unable to due to time constraints or political considerations?
A: Since taking up this post I have been keen to transform Dar Al-Ifta into an international organization that transcends location, time, and administration to put forward a model to all fatwa-issuing institutes in the world. This is by way of utilizing modern science with the objective of modernizing departments, such as the departments of arbitration, media, and programmed development, among others. I was also keen to develop and educate the Dar Al-Ifta&#8217;s second and third generations to the point that we now have a fourth generation represented by the outstanding students of the Faculty of Sharia Law at Al-Azhar University. They will be able to assume this historic responsibility (at Dar Al-Ifta). We were also concerned with the social role played by the Dar Al-Ifta in terms of confliction resolution. This is because we do not have any bias, except a bias towards scholarship, commitment to development, spreading love and peace among the people, re-building the land, and worshipping God. In order to preserve the largest amounts of fatwas and intellectual heritage left behind by the Dar Al-Ifta scholars, we signed a protocol agreement with the Ministry of Culture which aims to preserve the Dar Al-Ifta&#8217;s documents. This will see copies being made of all documents, with these then being placed in the Egyptian National Archives. In addition to this, copies of documents will remain at the Dar Al-Ifta, in addition to being sent to the Egyptian Central Bank and Al-Azhar.
Q: Many religious scholars and preachers, after leaving their post, move towards playing a stronger Islamic Dawa (Call) role. As the out-going Egyptian Mufti, would you agree with this assessment?
A: Religious scholars never stop serving their religion and community after leaving their post, and even after their deaths, for they leave behind knowledge that people can benefit from. We have undertaken ceaseless efforts to serve Islam, the Islamic community at home and abroad, supporting Islam and Muslims everywhere, because this is a great responsibility that God Almighty has given to the scholars We cannot retreat from this because this responsibility is not tied to any time or place or position, rather this is a message that must be fulfilled.
Q: Egypt is witnessing a state of extreme political division and difficulty. In your view, how can we overcome this?
A: This can be achieved by building consensus and moving away from division. When the Egyptians came to an agreement during the January 25 revolution, moving away from personal and partisan differences and division, they were able to topple a regime of corruption, injustice, and oppression. Let me go further and say that when they came together and reached this agreement they carried out one of the greatest revolutions in the world and showed everybody the meaning of advancement civilization. Therefore, I call on the Egyptian people to come together over what united them and to be united over Egypt and work for the advancement and renaissance of the country, and not grant Egypt&#8217;s enemies the opportunity to harm the country amid this divisive atmosphere.
Q: How would you characterize this divisive political scene precisely?
A: I can see that discord, strife, and partisan and self-interests are ruling the Egyptian scene, while national interests are absent. This is the malady, as for the cure this is unity and agreement. If we forget this, then society will be weakened and doomed but if we keep hold to this then our society will be strengthened. Everybody knows the importance of unity and we must put aside our differences, particularly now. We must ensure that difference of opinion do not escalate the crisis being faced by the Islamic community.
Q: What advice would you offer?
A: My advice is to protect unity, which is one of the most important duties at this time, until Egypt is able to move past this difficult period. The principle of agreement and reconciliation must serve as our barometer to measure what is happening in our country. We must also pay attention to development and confront our major problems.
Q: In your view, to what extent does Islam guarantee freedom of opinion? How do you view the protests and sit-ins taking place across the country?
A: Demonstrations and sit-ins can be seen in most countries and they are human rights on the condition that they do not harm others or disrupt their interests. The Hadith of the Prophet talks about this a lot. However the hadith also confirms that those who preserve the same approach are the least faithful. Therefore all Egyptians must work together to allow Egypt to overcome the current phase. I say to those who are preserving the same approach and disrupt the interests of the country and the people: Fear for yourselves and for your country because you will face the wrath of God. This is something that has nothing to do with freedom or democracy or the right to demonstrate. Everybody has the right peacefully express themselves in a legitimate manner; this is something that nobody can deny.
Q: Al-Azhar is set to establish a satellite television channel with some claiming that you may be placed in charge of this. What is your view?
A: The Al-Azhar channel is part of an attempt to confront the extremist religious satellite channels in their own backyard, not to mention the chaos and confusion that these channels spread by misleading people with false fatwas that including judging others as infidels. Our channel&#8217;s objective will be to promote a moderate approach and initiate rapprochement between the difference sects, eliminating the chaotic fatwas (issued by religious satellite television channels). This channel will follow the approach and ideology of Al-Azhar and will be overseen by scholars. The special committee formed to prepare the launch of this channel is working to ensure that this takes place as soon as possible. The channel will also utilize all forms of new media, technology, and communication while preserving the moderate and Islamic nature of our message. We will work to address all sections of Egyptian, Islamic and international society utilizing a simple but modern approach. At the same time, we will also work to address misrepresentations of Muslims and Islam, correct the image of Islam in the west, and clarify the facts of our tolerant religion.
Q: Most satellite channels are seeking to achieve their own interests and objectives; do you agree that securing personal gain seems to be the driving force behind the media these days?
A: There are media schools that are unfortunately pursuing the path of incitement, not enlightenment, and we completely reject this kind of media. I say to such figures that their religious, cultural and civilizational duty is to create, not destroy. They must illuminate this media practice of incitement. They must attract people without resorting to lies, deceptions, and unsubstantiated rumors. This is something that requires effort, in the same manner that any innovation requires effort. As for everybody only thinking about themselves and not caring about training or professionalism, this does not please God Almighty, the Prophet, or the believers. People are suspicious about this kind of media now, for this is represented by inciting against everything. Everybody must abide by honesty because this is what Islam has called us to. I previously called for a media honor code that will ensure that the elite and intellectuals stay away from trading baseless accusations, leaving the scene open for development and advancement.
Q: Some people are of the view that certain parties are attempting to undermined Al-Azhar and its symbols and prevent it from carrying out its role in terms of addressing the country&#8217;s major issues. Do you agree?
A: Al-Nobody can deny Al-Azhar&#8217;s national role. It has an immaculate history in defending religion and promoting moderation and tolerance, not to mention embracing open-mindedness. Over its long history and until today, Al-Azhar scholars play an active role in promoting tolerant and moderate Islam and in defending Egypt&#8217;s Islamic identity. Al-Azhar and is scholars are an integral part of society and are not detached from the country&#8217;s problems and reality. What we are seeing today is the best example of Al-Azhar&#8217;s interaction with the country&#8217;s concerns, namely the Al-Azhar Document. This demonstrates Al-Azhar&#8217;s desire to unite the country and eliminate the politics of marginalization and mistrust in order to ensure that the country reaches safety. Al-Azhar, as an important religious reference, is capable of putting forward practical advice on scientific, social, and other issues that demonstrate true Islam and solve the Muslim community&#8217;s problems. Al-Azhar is also capable of putting forward proposals to countries and governments, in addition to fixing the educational curriculum, or at the very least participating in deciding the Islamic educational issues, alongside other proposals that will have an impact on the Muslim&#8217;s situation, the prevalence of social peace, and the integration of the Muslim community. All of this will help the Muslims become valuable citizens who participate in building our civilization. Al-Azhar does not pay attention to voices that raise destructive, not constructive, slogans and views. Al-Azhar is followed the correct path and will not be turned away by these voices that are seeking to undermine us.
Q: It is easy for anybody to obtain a fatwa now. Some people believe that there should be a law licensing fatwa-issuance, particularly in the media. Do you agree?
A: Islamic scholars are very concerned with the fatwa-issuing process and have given this a high-profile due to its importance. The Prophet, peace be upon him, held this position during his lifetime, and after him it was held by the Prophet&#8217;s Companions, and then the scholars in general. Despite this, the religious arena today is in a state of chaos in terms of fatwa-issuance and religious discourse, due to the presence of non-specialists issuing fatwas, particularly via satellite television. This has led to a state of chaos and suspicion over religious issues. There can be no doubt that we must limit fatwa-issuance to scholars who specialize in this, ensuring that everybody has the proper standards for this important task.</description> 
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Female Saudi Shura Members Ready to Shine</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32990</link>
<description>
Riyadh/Jeddah, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;Dr. Lubna Al-Ansari, a member of the Saudi Shura Council, believes it is unlikely that the tasks of women in the council will be confined purely to women&#8217;s issues. According to her, such a notion undermines the role of women in the council, and even in the eyes of the local community.
After being inaugurated last week before the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the new member of the Shura Council confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that women have been admitted to the council not only to deal with women&#8217;s issues, but all local issues on an equal footing with their male peers. 
She said: &quot;When we took the oath we felt that the decision to admit women to the Shura Council was actually being enforced. We felt eager and enthusiastic, and we had a strong desire not to let our society down.&#8221; She added: &quot;The local community&#8217;s positive opinion of our performance is the strongest impetus for us to achieve the ambitions of the council, in addition to the confidence that the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques has placed in the cadres of qualified women&quot;. She revealed that the new female members hope to carry out their mission perfectly, and hope that the king&#8217;s decision will bring honor to women across all sectors of Saudi Arabia.
Regarding the mechanisms in place to form committees, and the committees that female members wish to join, Dr. Ansari remarked that women&#8217;s issues require the expertise of all committees regardless of whether they are related to economic, environmental, or other issues. She emphasized that it is important for women to be represented on all committees and to be concerned with all issues.
Dr. Ansari added, &quot;The council asks its members to specify the three committees they would like to be involved with. However, at the end of the day, the council has its own specific criteria. There should be a suitable distribution of female representation in all the committees by order of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Women should not be focused in one committee or in some committees but not in others. We should serve on committees related to our expertise. The presence of women in every committee will enrich the process.&#8221; She went on to say, &quot;The Shura Council is formed of 13 committees. Thus there should be two or three women members in every one. Huge efforts were exerted for women to reach the seats of the Shura Council in the first place, and myself and the 29 other women members are now qualified to undertake our roles in light of our long careers in academic and practical fields. We want to make big strides in society. I do not think there will be any adversarial feelings between the men and the women in the council, we are eager to work earnestly to give our best.&#8221;
Dr. Ansari asserts that the success of women in the council depends on the potential changes that could take place in society based on what they discuss. She pointed out that everyone is currently pained by what is happening in the field of health and education, with regards to women&#8217;s references and applications, and hopes to act to bring about changes in these areas. Dr. Ansari added, &quot;This is what we came for and this will be the true measure of women&#8217;s performance in the council. We will complement the accomplishments that were made by those who preceded us in past sessions through balance, inclusiveness, and recommendations to bring about the desired changes&quot;. Dr. Ansari did not specify the proposed timeframe to form the new committees. However, she pointed out that the formation will be debated in the next two weeks and that the council is actively working on the subject. &quot;The situation will become clearer soon,&quot; she concluded.
For her part, Dr. Haya al-Mani, another new member of the Shura Council, told Asharq Al-Awsat that she does not want to put forward a private agenda as a woman in the new session, because the council represents a complete system with its goals, vision, and agenda. However, she added that this does not mean she will not outline specific priorities. She revealed that she will take into consideration all the issues that serve civil rights, youths, women, and society as a whole, in accordance with the path of reform that King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz has undertaken. In this regard, Dr. Mani said, &quot;Of course, the issue of reform should definitely be raised and this is the right time to do so. We in Saudi Arabia are going through a prosperous period of self-reform that no one has or will dictate to us. In turn, this gives us more faith in participating in the reform process.&#8221;
Answering a question on what women will bring by joining the Shura Council, Dr Mani replied, &quot;The picture will become complete with the presence of women after the stagnant stage that has prevailed for some time. The presence of female members will add to the comprehensiveness of the council&#8217;s vision and their contribution will be doubled because by virtue of their nature, women are accurate and meticulous&quot;. 
Shura Council member Nura Bint-Adwan told Asharq Al-Awsat that the distribution of the committees will be discussed at the first session. She revealed that she will seek to join a committee dealing with human, educational, and family issues. She added, &quot;It is premature to talk about agendas and goals. The first session represents the first step. After that, we can talk about agendas and goals.&#8221; 
Finally, Dr. Dalal Al-Harbi, another female member, believes that the admission of women to the Shura Council represents an extension of the vital role that women have played in consultation and expertise ever since the foundation of the Saudi state.. Dr. Harbi told Asharq Al-Awsat: &quot;The speech that King Abdullah delivered on Tuesday was very significant, particularly since he stressed that change should come gradually and not through other pressures.&quot;
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<pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Behind the Scenes in Al-Qaeda</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32975</link>
<description>Riyadh, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;Osama Bin Laden&#8217;s obsession with America was the principal reason behind the first split within the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, a former member has revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Khalid Al-Johani said that Bin Laden&#8217;s pre-September 11 decision to focus his ire on America was a source of contention among the nascent organization&#8217;s members, particularly those from Arab states.
Johani said: &#8220;At the time, the matter led to the defection of the Yemeni Hamza Al-Quaiti from the organization. He established another camp, thanks to the external support he had received, before eventually resolving his dispute with Bin Laden, closing his new camp, and returning under the Al-Qaeda banner. However, this did not happen with other groups that had left Al-Qaeda for the same reason.&#8221;
Johani entered Afghanistan in 1996 via the Khyber Pass, facilitated by some influential Al-Qaeda members who had links with Pakistani border guards. He first met Osama Bin Laden two years later through Abu Faraj Al-Libbi. He informed Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Qaeda leaders advised Bin Laden to tone down his anti-Americanism, and opposed attacks on the US on the grounds that it had not attacked Afghanistan, unlike the Soviet Union.
Moreover, they warned that Afghanistan&#8217;s institutions were undergoing a process of reconstruction under the Taliban, and the country could not afford to make an enemy of the US. However, Bin Laden rejected this advice and carried out his threat to strike the World Trade Center in New York.
The former Al-Qaeda member revealed that he had his own reservations about Bin Laden&#8217;s grandiose terrorist plans. During a meeting with the Al-Qaeda leader prior to the 9/11 attacks, he expressed his hesitation. Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn AKA Abu Zubaydah and Abu Faraj Libbi subsequently offered to transfer him to the Ramzi Yousef battalion,of which Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was a notable member of. The battalion&#8217;s stated mission was to attack targets outside of Afghanistan. Johani rejected the transfer. He revealed that during this period, Bin Laden personally told him, &#8220;Don&#8217;t let us down, and we won&#8217;t let you down.&#8221;
He added that when the US Air Force began its bombardment of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda leadership ordered 350 fighters to retreat to the mountains of Tora Bora, along with Osama Bin Laden. The US bombardment led to the deaths of 10 Al-Qaeda members in less than a month, which greatly affected the morale of the fighters.
One member, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, attempted to mitigate the situation by releasing a statement announcing that the organization would re-order its ranks , while Bin Laden himself stressed that Al-Qaeda would emerge victorious and the US would withdraw from the country in light of its daily losses. Not long after this, Al-Qaeda&#8217;s fighters were ordered to withdraw from Tora Bora. Osama Bin Laden himself led the retreat, along with his 20 bodyguards, heading to an unknown location. While Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri headed elsewhere.
Johani explained that he attempted to flee to Pakistan with his unit, with the assistance of some Afghans. However, they were soon caught by US forces who detained them at their base in Kandahar. He revealed that Al-Qaeda members were not even aware that all Afghan cities had fallen under the control of the US as they were isolated from events in Tora Bora.
Johani also recounted the story of his arrest and transportation to Guantanamo Bay on an American aircraft, with a stop-over in Turkey. He arrived in Cuba on January 01, 2002. He was subsequently detained for nearly four years until he was handed over to Saudi Arabia in late 2005. Johani told Asharq Al-Awsat that he quickly became disillusioned during his time with Al-Qaeda, admitting that he initially believed those traveling to fight with the group were divine beings, but he soon realized that they were only ordinary people seeking money and power.
According to Johani, Bin Laden only had a few followers in 1998, with his recruits limited to three camps known as &#8220;Jihad&#8221;, &#8220;Farouk&#8221;, and &#8220;Omar.&#8221; However, in that year alone Nasir Al-Wuhayshi was able to recruit 30 new members along with 20 fighters. Wuhayshi had extensive relations in Yemen and Saudi Arabia through which he was able to attract young fighters with the call for jihad in Afghanistan, providing them with monthly salaries of up to USD 200 and guarantees of housing for married recruits.
Johani&#8217;s experience with jihadi groups also included a stint with an Islamist group in the Philippines led by Hashim Salamat, which was fighting to protest the massacres committed against Muslims at the hands of President Ferdinand Marcos&#8217;s forces. Johani revealed that the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi used to send weapons shipments to Islamist fighters in the Philippines, after relations with its government deteriorated. However, Johani&#8217;s experience here did not last long and this group broke up after one of its most prominent leaders, Omar Al-Faruq, was arrested in Jakarta.
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<pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Could Behind the Scenes Diplomacy Help in Syria?</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32968</link>
<description>London, Asharq Al-Awsat - Is Syrian President Bashar al-Assad seeking a negotiated way to end his country&#8217;s bloody civil war?
This is the hope, some might say illusion, that the United Nations&#8217; emissary Lakhdar Brahimi is trying to keep alive through diplomatic maneuvers.
Three factors have helped create this hope. 
The first is John Kerry&#8217;s appointment as President Barack Obama&#8217;s Secretary of State. Unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, Kerry has a close understanding of the Syrian leader&#8217;s mindset. As a Democrat Senator, Kerry travelled to Damascus for meetings lasting several hours with Assad. Over the years, Kerry&#8217;s Portuguese-born wife Maria Teresa Thierstein brought the two families closer by forging a friendship with Assad&#8217;s wife Asma Akhras. Also interesting is the fact that Kerry&#8217;s daughter Vanessa is married to an Iranian doctor, expanding the Kerry family&#8217;s understanding of the region.
As a presidential candidate in 2004, Kerry attacked President George W Bush as a &#8220;trigger happy&#8221; leader addicted to &#8220;cowboy diplomacy&#8221;, and called for an overhaul of foreign policy. Last week, Kerry dropped tantalizing hints about &#8220;fresh ideas&#8221; to end the conflict in Syria.
The second factor that may give credence to hopes of a deal is the growing realization in Assad&#8217;s circles that the only way to enable the Baathists to retain a share of power is to persuade the president to move to the sidelines.
The third factor is the evolution of the Russian position. Moscow realizes that betting on Assad has led to Russia&#8217;s isolation in the Middle East. Thus, if Assad could be ditched without this appearing as a defeat for Russia, Moscow might be ready to cooperate.
According to our sources, the outline of a deal has been put to Assad with the help of two Lebanese politicians close to him. Under the proposed deal, Assad would agree to a transition during which he would &#8220;stand aside&#8221;. The choice of words is important because Assad insists he would not &#8220;stand down&#8221; before the end of his presidential term in May 2014.
A draft of the proposed deal states that Assad would nominate one of his vice presidents as head of a &#8220;government of transition&#8221;, in which opposition parties would nominate one third of the ministers. Another third would be chosen by the ruling coalition led by the Arab Socialist Baath Party, while the remaining third would consist of &#8220;respected personalities&#8221;, accepted by both sides.
The transitional government would propose constitutional amendments to be submitted to a referendum. It would then organize parliamentary and presidential elections within a year. Assad hopes to remain president until the end of his current mandate next year, and during that period he would delegate his executive powers to the prime minister, retaining his symbolic functions as head of state.
In exchange for &#8220;stepping aside&#8221; Assad wants immunity from prosecution on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Any prosecution through the International Criminal Court would have to be ratified by the Security Council. A US veto could stop any such attempt, and thus Assad hopes that Kerry can obtain him the desired immunity.
Assad also wants &#8220;guarantees&#8221; that once a transition government is formed, the &#8220;Friends of Syria&#8221; group of over 100 nations will stop supporting armed opposition groups.  In return the bloc, led by the US, would help establish a ceasefire enabling the Syrian army to &#8220;secure the nation&#8217;s borders&#8221; and restore law and order.
What Assad refuses to contemplate is a pledge not to run as a candidate in future presidential elections. Although most members of his family have left Syria for safety in exile, Assad himself rejects suggestions that he, too, should leave Syria.
The proposed deal has received a cautious welcome from parts of the Syrian opposition. However, the overwhelming majority, especially among armed opposition groups, does not trust Assad and sees the proposed deal as a trick to buy him time.
Most members of the &#8220;Friends of Syria&#8221; bloc also doubt Assad&#8217;s reliability. Several Arab states, notably Egypt, insist that Assad&#8217;s unambiguous departure from power should be the first step, not the last, in any transition.
Another problem is that Assad may no longer have the last word in Damascus, where Iran has created a network of its own within the ruling elite. Iranian &#8220;Supreme Guide&#8221; Ali Khamenei has repeatedly stated that he would not allow Assad to fall.
Analysts say, although a glimmer of hope remains, that Kerry and Brahimi may soon find that the light at the end of the tunnel was more of an illusion.</description> 
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>GCC Environment Chief Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat </title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32958</link>
<description>Riyadh, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;With the erratic but steady progress of Iran&#8217;s nuclear program and the announcement of nuclear power projects in some other Gulf states, the issue of nuclear safety and environmental protection in the region is more important than ever. As a result, the technical and scientific problems surrounding it are now rising up the agenda of regional states to join the existing economic and social problems that have bedeviled them in recent decades, chiefly the need to create enough jobs for the region&#8217;s thousands of young university graduates.
Asharq Al-Alwsat spoke to Dr Abdullah Aqlah Al-Hashem, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian and Environmental Affairs in the secretariat of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), about the organization&#8217;s efforts to tackle new environmental problems, as well as its efforts to deal with youth unemployment, the political fallout of the Arab Spring, and plans for further regional integration.
Q: The recent GCC summit produced several significant resolutions. How important are these resolutions, and how will they be achieved?
A: The 33rd GCC summit recently held in Bahrain was of a special character. It focused on very important topics. Take for example the initiatives that are being implemented presently, which include those surrounding the subject of the Gulf&#8217;s youth. There were diverging views about how to best invest in our youth, especially considering that they represent the majority of the Gulf&#8217;s population, but that divergence occurred because the youth are in need of many things. They need education and health care, and more importantly, they need a productive way to spend their spare time in a manner that benefits their countries, and prevents them from drifting into unhealthy activities. This means creating jobs that absorbs their energies and abilities. This cannot be accomplished by the public sector alone; it is imperative that the private sector play a role in absorbing the potential of the younger generations and help fix the issues of dropouts and the difficult job market.
Q: (Interjecting) Do you think that the private sector has fulfilled its role regarding accommodating the Gulf&#8217;s youth?
A: I believe that there are indications that the private sector has started down the path which we had hoped it would. On the other hand one must acknowledge that the private sector is first and foremost profit-based, but it should shoulder some social responsibility in this area. The public sector must work in conjunction with the private sector by setting standards that regulating the distribution of work opportunities and job opportunities in a manner that is smooth and does not drain both sectors. There are already regulations in place in the GCC countries which encourage the private sector to participate in absorbing the Gulf&#8217;s youth into the labor market. For instance, Sultan Qaboos recently decreed that foreigners may only comprise 33 percent of a company&#8217;s workforce.
Q: Are there any examples of joint ventures between GCC members to harness the energies of the young?
A: This question is very important. I recall a recent summit resolution regarding establishing youth-based initiatives that could absorb their energies which included an integrated program with working plans. The first matter is training young people to be competitive in the job market. The private sector has complained of the lack of strong credentials, qualitative training, and specialization among the Gulf&#8217;s youth. This does not help them progress in the workplace. There is a lack of regional institutions that offer training and specialized instruction. However the Gulf has tried to address this by signing agreements with European, American, and Asian institutes to train Gulf youth and enhance their credentials. Consequently work must be done to establish massive projects capable of absorbing as many graduates of these institutions as possible. Here I can say that if we were are able to succeed in providing good training for young people, then we will have prepared them for competing in the local and international job market. For example, the oil sector in GCC countries rarely hires graduates from the Gulf. One other industry I will mention that lacks Gulf youth is the automobile industry, and there are many other vital sectors which need trained and qualified young people.
Q: Do you have any new initiatives directed at the Gulf youth which you intend to submit at the next summit in Kuwait?
A: Yes, we have a bundle of large initiatives, six in total, which are all aimed at young people. These projects must offer young people avenues to express their abilities, demands, and skills. It is important that education be given priority throughout its various stages. For example Japan focuses on primary level education, which it considers the base upon which all future education rests. It provides its youth with programs that will benefit them as graduates, including social sciences, ethics, and inter-personal interactions. I think we in the Gulf desperately need this, especially considering that we have an abundance of money.
Q: Is there a project on the impact of the media on young people?
A: What you just mentioned is the fourth of the six projects. We want our media to be sophisticated and competitive, but socially responsible. The media should not be a source of chaos. It is noteworthy that there are more satellite channels in the Arab world than there are universities, there being 560 satellite channels and only a handful of universities. That represents a serious danger because subversive campaigns could distort the mentality of the Arab audience in the Gulf. Thus we must work to contain these hazards before they reach the minds of our youth.
Q: Youth-led factions have come to the fore in some Arab and Gulf countries, with loyalties being established at a young age to certain ideologies or groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Is this something that concerns the GCC?
A: It is an emerging phenomenon with a limited scope, but nonetheless it must be treated with the utmost seriousness. However it would be difficult for a movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood to spread across the various Gulf countries, and such is the case with liberals, socialists, and other currents. But the existence of these groups is an undeniable reality. This requires that we approach them in such a way that does not collide with them, but rather that listens to others, understands their point of view, and studies the changing scene carefully so that we can know if it is an organic change or imported from abroad and the result of external pressure. This way we will know how to address it. Generally speaking, our sons and daughters who embrace certain streams of thought should be engaged in discussions so that we may understand their political orientations, so long as it does not hurt the overarching interests of the country and society. We do not want to clash with them; that will only muddy the waters and provide cover for others to exploit our young people and harm our communities.
Q: In light of the changes surrounding the region, what do you think are the biggest threats to the security of the Gulf countries?
A: The Arabian Gulf is not very large in terms of breadth and depth. Every year between 30,000 and 40,000 ships from across the globe pass through this small waterway, carrying oil, trade goods, and other materials. There are more than 90 cities and villages on both sides of the Gulf. The biggest challenge is keeping track of the ships, which requires that we enhance cooperation efforts with our neighboring countries.
Of course war with Iran is not in our interest and we wish to avoid such an outcome. Therefore, it is imperative to establish a permanent peace. This does not mean that we are against the use of nuclear energy, but it must be used peacefully and for peaceful purposes, not for war. This requires full transparency on Iran&#8217;s part and it must allow the international and Gulf communities to oversee and verify the peaceful nature of its endeavors so as to reassure everyone. We know that the Iranian Bushehr reactor was built by the Germans in 1975 and was shutdown in 1979. We have detailed information about the nuclear reactors and their classifications in Iran and elsewhere. Thus when Iran is not transparent in its nuclear activities, it poses a risk to everyone, and only 200 to 250 km divides us from Tehran. We have no objection to cooperating with Iran and discussing the risks so as to reach an agreement and create a safer and more peaceful world for us all.
Q: Let me ask you a question about Iran&#8217;s nuclear activities. How do you view this threat to the Gulf, and how do you plan to deal with it?
A: (Interjecting) It is not just a question of war and a nuclear blast; the radiation would spread very quickly and very far [in the event of a serious accident]. Not to mention the chemical and environmental pollution and the contaminants that are easily detectable. However the real the danger is the radiation because it has no color, taste, or smell. Therefore the average citizen would not be aware that he or she is within the contaminated zone. Moreover, that the radiation remains for a long time, in the food, clothing, air, land, crops, livestock, everything. Thus radioactive contamination is unlike other types of pollution which are geographically and temporally limited, and it cannot be treated or contained in a safe manner. Unfortunately Iran&#8217;s reactors have aroused fear amongst its neighbors and amongst pearl and coral merchants who rely on a pristine natural environment. This also violates the water security of the people of the region, which is one of the world&#8217;s most vital commodities.
Q: The Gulf Center for Environmental Monitoring and Radiation Assessment, how is it coming along, where will it will be based, and how will it operate?
A: It will be based in the United Arab Emirates. It will begin operating soon, before the coming summit in Kuwait. It is a science center with laboratories, and there is a committee called the Meteorological Committee which works with satellite technology to monitor air, water, and food conditions in addition to importers and exporters operating in customs areas and the extent of radioactive contamination. This resolution was adopted in light of the radiation found in Ireland. Ireland&#8217;s geography is similar to ours, because there is a waterway separating them from a country with nuclear facilities, the United Kingdom. The Irish have experts and scholars studying the radiological situation and its implications 24-hours a day. They also assess the relationship between radiation and wildlife, water, and disease.
Q: Iran has decided to continue developing its nuclear reactors despite protests from the rest of the world. By what mechanism will the GCC countries deal with this problem, specifically, God forbid, in the event of a disaster?
A: This is a very important question. But let me assure you of our comprehensive preparedness. We would respond in accordance with the joint Gulf contingency plan, and we have established an organization called the Marine Protection Organization based in Kuwait, which includes the Gulf countries in addition to Iraq and Iran, which works at a global scale. We have also established the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center (MEMAC). The Abu Dhabi summit also adopted a contingency plan which has since been presented to an American company for implementation, but it demanded a 20 percent increase on what was originally agreed. After that it was proposed to several other international companies, and the tender was awarded to a Canadian company which operates in the GCC in risk management, training, and awareness building. It will work on addressing the risks facing our countries.
Q: A report was recently published which stated that in the event of a war or nuclear disaster in Iran, only ten percent of Iranian territory would be impacted, and the majority of the damage would fall on the Gulf. Is this accurate?
A: This report was most likely published by Iranian sources. With all due respect to our neighbor Iran, I believe that this report is not entirely credible. Their communications with the outside world and with us are subject to censorship, in matters political and scientific. We are tied to them with many common bonds, including religion, geography, history, and trade. All we ask is that they commit to operating transparently and credibly, not only in relation to us in the Gulf, but also with all others around the world who understand the risks and seek to address them. I will reiterate that the risks that would result from their reactors would exceed their containment capacity and the capacity of others. This reminds me of the Russian reactor and the fallout it caused, in addition to what happened in Japan despite the fact that its reactor was of the fourth generation which are lauded for their high levels of security and safety. The Bushehr reactor is based on the most active earthquake zone in the world, and has low levels of security and safety to begin with.
Q: There was also a report which stated that the Bushehr reactor had leaked radiation, making it the most dangerous Iranian nuclear reactor.
A: The first company that assisted Iran in building the Bushehr reactor was the German company Siemens, and thus it was not the Russians as some would think. However in 1979 after the Iranian revolution, the German company&#8217;s activities were halted, and in 1985 a Russian company came and signed a contract with Iran to build a nuclear reactor for $2.5 billion. The Iranian government then decided to complete the construction of the first nuclear reactor, contracting again with a Russian company for $800 million. This reactor is dangerous because it was the result of two different construction companies, and unfortunately the people of Iran know nothing about that. Moreover, Iran has not signed any international nuclear safety and security agreements since 1994, and, of course, to be bound by these agreements means to be committed to global security and not Iranian security, so there is a moral responsibility to be borne by Iran in this regard.
Q: In light of this serious situation, do the GCC countries possess radiation sensors? Is there a plan to protect the Gulf from radiation? And is cooperating with Iran the best defence against it?
A: Yes, in all GCC countries there are radiation sensors assessing the levels of radiation, and there is a system governing this process that uses satellite measurements to gather information. There is also a contingency plan set in place if, God forbid, an explosion in a particular place were to occur. Teams are trained how to address the impact of radiation, and have instructions regarding how to interact with citizens. As for the question of cooperating with Iran, we have proposals to which they could agree through negotiations with the International Maritime Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the global community. All we ask of Iran is to sit at the table of peace and security with us because there is no better way than through cooperation and negotiation.
Q: About 30,000 to 40,000 ships pass through the waterways of the Arabian Gulf each year. To what extent is the pollution of the region caused by this? Do you have something in place to prevent pollution from these sources?
A: The Gulf is contaminated chemically and biologically, and suffers from waste water pollutants, waste from ships, and unsustainable fishing practices. We are active members in the Organization for Marine Protection and are a party to the agreement called MARPOL, which compels us to hold those ships accountable so as to limit their waste. Some countries recently established facilities for the treatment of pollutants and waste. There is also a Gulf study in coordination with the World Bank underway which is surveying marine animal and plant life. Thus the Gulf is making efforts to reduce pollution and mitigate waste. This has become big business for solid, chemical, or biological waste mitigation firms.
Q: What about the water linkage project authorized during GCC Summit 32?
A: Connecting water lines or railways or any other sort of connection would mean the creation of whole new cities and many new jobs. Industries that work in joining together various networks are expanding across the world. Movement across the various GCC countries has become important, as well establishing connections across the various electrical grids. Creating these links has become a commercially viable market as evidenced by the European Union. Therefore this linking up in the Gulf will bring us economic, political, and social benefits. Moreover the conflicts and disputes between us will decline because of the work being done to advance our common interests. Our oil profits allow us to buy water resources from anywhere and in turn we can make this into a profitable market and source of jobs. This will enable us to be prepared for 2032 when we will embark on a new direction in terms of our oil resources, 90% of which we use on water and electricity according to studies.</description> 
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<item>
<title>New Riyadh Governor: Prince Khalid bin Bandar</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32917</link>
<description>Riyadh, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;Speaking exclusively to Asharq Al-Awsat, newly appointed governor of Riyadh, Prince Khalid bin Bandar bin Abdulaziz, emphasized, &#8220;My primary goal will be to serve the capital and study its requirements in all affairs, placing it at the top of the list of priorities, after absorbing what is going on as soon as I start work.&#8221;
Prince Khalid said that he, along with newly appointed Deputy Governor of Riyadh, Prince Turki bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, are honored to take up their new posts. Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz had previously served as Governor of Riyadh, being succeeded by Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz. Prince Khalid stressed that his predecessors had contributed, in an effective manner, in putting in place the major rules (for governorship) &#8220;which is something that will reflect positively on my forthcoming mission.&#8221;
He added, &#8220;I am one of the servants of the nation and I am proud of the confidence shown in me by Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. I will work to achieve the aspirations of the king and crown prince, which primarily is to serve the citizens.&#8221;
Prince Khalid previously held the position of commander of the Royal Saudi Land Forces. He has master&#8217;s degree in military sciences and has won a number of military decorations and award.
Prince Khalid&#8217;s military career began when he joined the First Battalion of the Fourth Armored Brigade; he later served as an operations officer in the Armored Forces command before being promoted to the position of deputy commander. Prince Khalid was promoted to the rank of Major General in 1997, before becoming deputy commander of the Royal Saudi Land Forces. A royal decree promoted him to the rank of Lieutenant General and Commander of Land Forces in 2011.
 
</description> 
<pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<item>
<title>Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: Muslim Brotherhood Sec-Gen Dr. Mahmoud Hussein</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32914</link>
<description>
Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Muslim Brotherhood Secretary-General Dr. Mahmoud Hussein criticized Egypt&#8217;s opposition media, claiming that they report lies and fabrication. Hussein, also a member of the Brotherhood&#8217;s Guidance Bureau, also spoke about the political situation in Egypt, the rumors regarding the so-called Muslim Sisterhood, and the Brotherhood&#8217;s chances at the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
Born in Jaffa, Palestine, in 1947, Mahmoud Hussein grew up in Beersheba and attended high school in Rafah, Gaza, at a time when it was under Egyptian rule. He reportedly became active in the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s while studying at Iowa City University in the US, serving as president of the Brotherhood-affiliated Muslim American Youth Association (MAYA). During this period, he met with other future Brotherhood leaders including President Mohamed Mursi. Upon returning to Egypt, Hussein became a professor of engineering at Egypt&#8217;s Assiut University.  He was arrested on a number of occasions for his Brotherhood ties, being imprisoned between1995 and 1998. He was elected to the Brotherhood&#8217;s Guidance Bureau in 2004 and currently serves as the Brotherhood&#8217;s Secretary-General. He is one of the four Muslim Brotherhood leaders responsible for coordination with the Freedom and Justice Party.
The following is the full text of the interview:
[Asharq Al-Awsat] You have been quoted as saying that the Muslim Brotherhood&#8217;s real battle is with the media and that the calls to oust President Mohamed Mursi have no value. Do you stand by these statements? Why did you characterize the Brotherhood&#8217;s relationship with the media as a battle? Wouldn&#8217;t it be more accurate to say that the Brotherhood has failed to win over Egypt&#8217;s media?
[Hussein] Firstly, what has been attributed to me in the press is not accurate. As for saying that the Brotherhood failed to win over the media . . . if you are talking about the biased media outlets that are telling lies about the Brotherhood, then such media outlets are not with the people, nor do they have professional journalistic standards. The fair media that reports the facts is not against the Muslim Brotherhood, nor are we against it.
Regarding the calls to topple the president, these have no value because real opposition includes opposition of policies and views and the proposal of alternatives and solutions. There are constitutional mechanisms for deposing a president elected by the people, therefore what we are hearing from many of those that the media has dubbed the &#8220;opposition&#8221; is absurd, and nothing more than an attempt to create chaos and incite violence. They are seeking to topple the state, not just the president. Anybody who monitors the media on a daily basis will be able to see this clearly. We do not care who is behind this, for this is the task of the competent authorities, rather we believe that the truth will come out regardless of how falsehood attempts to conceal it. This is something that has always been proven by history.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] President Mursi, and prior to this Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat El-Shater, affirmed the success of the Brotherhood&#8217;s &#8220;Renaissance&#8221; program. However the economic, political and social situation in Egypt today hardly lends itself to the term renaissance. What is the reason for this?
[Hussein] I believe that those trying to promote and incite violence and disrupt production are the same people trying to stop Egypt&#8217;s renaissance, regardless of the presence of this project. It is not logical during the current fluid situation, when the president has only been in power for a short term and there is general instability present on the scene, for this (project) to be able to solve economic and social problems created by decades-long corruption and political tyranny.  
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Could you comment on allegations that Khairat El-Shater is the man who is truly responsible for the Brotherhood&#8217;s development file, and oversees foreign relations and the renaissance project? What is El-Shater&#8217;s real role in the Brotherhood and government?
[Hussein] These are all lies and fabrications designed to tarnish the image of Khairat El-Shater, as well as tarnish the image of the president by claiming that somebody is manipulating him from behind the scenes. Everybody knows&#8212;and the evidence confirms&#8212;that the president is managing the state through its institutions and via his own aides and advisers and that the Muslim Brotherhood has no involvement in this. As for the Brotherhood, it is administered through its own institutions and is not ruled or driven by any single figure. El-Shater responsibility for the development file does not mean that he is the decision-maker; rather everything that is decided must go through the Brotherhood&#8217;s Guidance Bureau for approval and amendment. These decisions are then raised to the Shura Council for approval. This applies to all files supervised by the Brotherhood Guidance Bureau members.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The National Salvation Front is calling for protests against the government and president, seeking to oust Mursi and revoke the constitution. They are citing the presence of political tyranny and injustice. What would you like to say to the National Salvation Front leaders?
[Hussein] I would tell the National Salvation Front to respect God and the Egyptian people and carry out a real constructive opposition and put forward practical solutions to resolve the country&#8217;s many problems. They must know that the people will not forgive their calls for violence and history will record this against them, for God will preserve Egypt from all evils.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Some political parties are calling for the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood, or at least to modify its legal status. What&#8217;s your response to this?
[Hussein] The Muslim Brotherhood has been legal since it was established under the former regime, however when a law is ratified regarding the Brotherhood&#8217;s structure, at this point it will be incumbent on all bodies, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to reconcile their positions according to this new law.  Regarding the sources of financing, the Brotherhood is self-funded from the pockets of its members and the Brotherhood does not receive any financial support from any domestic or foreign or international organization.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Is there any truth to the rumors regarding the so-called Muslim Sisterhood and the establishment of a parallel Muslim Sisterhood Guidance Bureau?  Does this have anything to do with the reported Muslim Sisterhood group uncovered in the UAE? Is the Brotherhood intending to expand in the Gulf States?
[Hussein] Such talk is completely false, and comes as part of the usual repeated claims against the Brotherhood.  There is a special file regarding the Muslim Sisterhood . . . to accompany the changing atmosphere in Egypt.  The Brotherhood in any country operates according to the local laws and in favor of the people. They had been present (in the UAE) for a number of years and there has been no evidence that they did anything illegal.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you believe that the Brotherhood&#8217;s Freedom and Justice party will be able to win a parliamentary majority in the next election? If the Brotherhood does win a majority, do you think that the other political parties will accept the election results?
[Hussein] The political forces will not accept the verdict of the ballot box unless it is in their own favor, so how can they talk about democracy?
[Asharq Al-Awsat] As an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader born in Palestine, what is your view of Egyptian&#8212;Israeli relations? How can we solve the Palestinian crisis?
[Hussein] The Brotherhood&#8217;s position is to support the Palestinian Cause and the Palestinian people, until their full rights are returned to them. My personal position is identical to the Brotherhood&#8217;s position, because we believe that rights are not lost so long as the people continue to call for them, and no country can reside and settle on land that does not belong to it. Therefore the Zionist presence on Palestinian land is temporary and fleeting, God willing. As for Egyptian &#8211; Israeli relations, these are relations between nations that are governed by treaties and diplomacy, and you should ask those responsible for this for their opinions on this issue.
</description> 
<pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Iyad Ag Ghali: Mali's Desert Fox</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32913</link>
<description>In early January at the Battle of Konna in northern Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar Dine, laid waste to scores of Malian soldiers trained by French and European military officials. In a matter of days, French Special Forces had touched down in Malian territory to prevent the collapse of the state of Mali, and to hunt down the man French Special Forces now consider their top target in North Africa. 
Iyad Ag Ghali, accompanied by his colleague Abdul Hamid Abu Zeid (leader of the Tariq Ibn Ziyad Battalion), also led the fighting in the town of Diabaly. Eventually the Malian army was forced to withdraw which in turn expanded the scope of the conflict between Ag Ghali, his counterparts, and the French. Then Ag Ghali disappeared into the desert, holing up in the Taghar Gharat Mountains near the town of Kidal on Mali&#8217;s north-eastern border with Algeria.
Despite the many controversies that have surrounded Ag Ghali throughout his life, his countrymen are in agreement that he is the rightful leader of the Azawad territory. They claim that he helped spark the rebellion of June, 28, 1990 by attacking the city of M&#233;naka in Mali&#8217;s northeast and spearheading the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, which was founded in 1984.
This short, stocky man of fifty-plus years wears the traditional turban of the Saharan Tuareg people. Clad in his conspicuously expensive African clothes, he wields great influence at meetings and local gatherings, despite the fact that he rarely speaks and has a penchant for discretion.
Ag Ghali was an active member of a Pakistani branch of the non-violent Tablighi Jamaat operating in North Africa, which avoids sensitive sectarian issues and instead calls for the unification of the Islamic nation. While Ag Ghali was still with Tablighi Jamaat, a Mauritanian analyst who specializes in jihadist groups operating in the Sahel region of Africa met with the future militia commander. Describing Ag Ghali, the analyst said he was &#8220;Amiable, courteous, and extremely pious. He had a strong presence during meetings, but was tight-lipped and rarely-spoke.&#8221;
Ag Ghali began his long and arduous journey in the mountains near the city of Kidal in Mali&#8217;s far north. There he was born to an influential family of the Ifogas Tuareg tribe, which itself holds sway over much of Azawad (the Tuareg term for northern Mali). Some who knew Ag Ghali during his youth say that he led a libertine life filled with music, poetry, and late nights which focused on talk of politics.
Then the drought came and decimated the Sahel-Sahara region, ending the carefree lifestyle of many Tuaregs. Fate forced many Tuareg men and boys to leave their homeland for neighboring countries. At some point in the 1980s, Ag Ghali&#8217;s journey landed him in Colonel Muammar Gaddafi&#8217;s Libya.
In Libya Ag Ghali received military training and joined the ranks of Gaddafi&#8217;s Green Brigade which was comprised mainly of Tuareg tribesmen. Having excelled in training, he earned a place in the Libyan mission sent to Lebanon to fight alongside Palestinians against the Israelis and various Lebanese militias.
Those close to Ag Ghali say that the Lebanon mission was his first true taste of military combat. He returned to North Africa on board a French steamship in the company of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and thus began the game of cat and mouse between the elusive Tuareg leader and the French military: a game which still continues to this day.
Several years after returning from Lebanon, Iyad Ag Ghali led missions in Chadian territory at the behest of Colonel Gaddafi, where he aided the rebels there in their quest to overthrow the regime of former President Hiss&#232;ne Habr&#233;. However the French anticipated the coup and quelled it.
Following these military expeditions, Ag Ghali returned to northern Mali in the early 1990s to form a rebel militia which opposed the Malian central government based in Bamako. This rebellion persisted for more than twenty years, fighting countless battles and signing various truces, all the while with Ag Ghali at the helm. Last year Ag Ghali founded Ansar Dine, which outwardly seeks the establishment of an Islamic emirate the likes of which Azawad has never seen.
Despite the support and loyalty of his fellow tribesmen, disputes have divided the rebellion&#8217;s ranks. After the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords with the Malian government in 1991, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad fractured into three separate movements, with Iyad Ag Ghali assuming control of one of these splinter groups, dubbed the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA). The MPA became the forerunner of Ansar Dine, but differed in that it carried a distinct ethnic component, with thousands of Ag Ghali&#8217;s fellow Ifogas tribesmen forming the core of the organization.
Iyad Ag Ghali was the only rebel to support the 1992 National Pact. The Popular Movement of Azawad was finally dissolved in 1996 and weapons were ceremonially burned in Timbuktu as a symbolic conclusion to the conflict in what was known as the Flamme de la Paix. Ag Ghali reverted to open rebellion through the Democratic Alliance for Change, of which he became secretary-general. However, in 2007 he returned to the negotiating table to oversee the signing of the Algiers Agreement.
During this period Ag Ghali became close with the central authorities in Bamako, and in November, 2007, he was appointed as an adviser at the Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. However he was deported in 2010 on charges of &#8220;suspicious relations with al-Qaeda.&#8221;
Two years later Ag Ghali resurfaced with Ansar Dine, which he described as &#8220;A popular jihadist movement seeking to implement sharia law in Mali.&#8221;
Iyad Ag Ghali has always been a figure shrouded in mystery, and his opponents claim that this enigmatic quality is what has allowed him to persevere time and again as the leader of the Azawad rebellion, both as a nationalist on a patriotic mission, and as a jihadist seeking to establish an Islamic emirate. His opponents also stress that Ag Ghali has had to stave off many rivals to maintain his position of prominence in Azawad, and the fact that he hails from one of the largest and most influential tribes in northern Mali has little to do with his success.
Abu Bakr Al-Ansari, a Tuareg writer and intellectual, revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that, &#8220;Iyad Ag Ghali&#8217;s designs to gain control of Azawad began in Algeria in 1992 with the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords. After the agreement was signed, Algerian generals created a rift between the peoples of Kidal and Timbuktu by promoting junior officers and by marginalizing the political leader of the 1992 revolution, Mohammed Ali al-Ansari.
Mr. Ansari, who resides in Nouakchott, added that, &#8220;After the Tamanrasset Accords, Ag Ghali entered into a tepid alliance with the authorities in Bamako, with whom he conspired to undermine the Accords&#8217; detractors. He waged a war against the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad killing thousands from the Arab Barabish tribe. This sowed distrust between the Arabs residing in Timbuktu and their Tuareg neighbors; fearing the wrath of Iyad Ag Ghali, the Arabs too entered into an alliance with Bamako.
Mr. Ansari continued, saying, &#8220;Ag Ghali also waged a targeted war against the Tuareg Amghad tribe, the cause of which some believe can be traced back to his personal rivalry with Hadj Ag Gamo, an officer in the Malian Army. This conflict ignited clashes between Ag Ghali&#8217;s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad led by Abdul Rahman Ghala. Ag Ghali emerged victorious but only after the two rival clans had lost many fighters.
Mr. Ansari shed light on the other events which elevated Iyad Ag Ghali to prominence alongside his military exploits: &#8220;Regional actors opened doors for Ag Ghali and removing his competitors: Mano Dayak, who had grappled with Ag Ghali for leadership of Azawad, was killed in 1995; Ibrahim Ag Bahanga was killed in a suspicious car accident in 2011; and Rhissa Ag Sidi Mohamed, head of the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad, was marginalized.&#8221;
In the latter stages of his life, Ag Ghali changed from the young exuberant man he once was to a reserved man deeply devout in his Islamic teachings. His new Salafist lifestyle first became apparent when he began to refuse to shake hands with women, made his wife wear the veil, and used sharia law to govern his family affairs. He became an ardent activist in the Pakistani branch of Tablighi Jamaat, and accompanied them on missionary trips to a number of neighboring countries, including Mauritania. However, his time with Tablighi Jamaat did not quell his Salafist jihadist vision of establishing a sharia-governed Islamic emirate in Azawad under the banner of Ansar Dine.
Iyad Ag Ghali established relations with militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). When AQIM kidnapped fourteen European tourists in 2003, Ag Ghali played a major mediating role. He used his tribal and military leverage in addition to his complex network of contacts within militant Islamist groups, which had absorbed many local tribes, to ultimately win the release of the hostages.
However on the flip side, Ag Ghali&#8217;s mediations between AQIM and Western countries afforded him significant kickbacks. This income flow added to his already substantial wealth, making him one of the richest individuals in a severely impoverished region where smuggling is rampant.
All the while Iyad Ag Ghali&#8217;s fundamentalism grew in parallel with his strengthening relations with jihadist Salafist organizations, until ultimately he completed his transformation from a nationalist rebel championing the rights of a marginalized region to a jihadist championing the establishment of an Islamic emirate.
Islem Walad Salehi, a researcher specialised in jihadist groups based in the Sahel region, told Asharq Al-Awsat  that, &#8220;Iyad Ag Ghali holds significant sway in Azawad where he first began as a nationalist leader during the Tuareg uprising of 1991. He then brokered and signed a number of peace agreements and believed that Azawad&#8217;s woes could be resolved politically. However he unfortunately became disillusioned after the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 2007; the political, economic, and social aspects of the agreement were never enforced whereas the Tuareg&#8217;s fulfilled their pledge to disarm. For him, this agreement was merely an attempt to neutralise the Tuareg and their national aspirations. Thus his hopes were crushed and he was severely dejected.
&#8220;Iyad Ag Ghali&#8217;s disenchantment coincided with a personal religious awakening. It is widely known that ten years ago he joined the Tablighi Jamaat and accompanied them on a mission in 2002 to the city of Nouadhibou in Mauritania&#8217;s far north. Fed by his blighted hopes, Ag Ghali&#8217;s religiosity grew in its fervency, until ultimately he abandoned his nationalist aspirations and shifted his focus to religious matters. He then founded Ansar Dine which has since imposed sharia law across the vast Azawad lands which fall under his control.&#8221;
Mr. Ansari told Asharq Al-Awsat, that, &#8220;Iyad Ag Ghali had led the revolution in Azawad, but he betrayed his homeland&#8217;s nationalist endeavors and became a puppet of neighboring countries, particularly Algeria, which sought to undermine Azawad&#8217;s nationalist aspirations.&#8221;
Mr. Ansari explained the reasons why hundreds of Tuareg fighters subscribed to Iyad Ag Ghali&#8217;s new vision of establishing an Islamic emirate in Azawad: &#8220;The Azawad region is experiencing difficult economic times. The people there suffer from severe poverty, unemployment, famine, and illiteracy. Thus it is easy for someone as wealthy as Iyad Ag Ghali to buy the loyalty of the locals and turn them into compliant warriors, and the fact that he hails from an influential and long-established tribe only adds to his recruiting powers.&#8221;
Mr. Ansari holds Ag Ghali responsible for the French intervention in northern Mali and claims that his recent actions directly caused the French deployment. According to him this intervention is unacceptable because it favors the interests of the central state and neglects Azawad&#8217;s nationalist aspirations.
For both his critics and apologists, Iyad Ag Ghali&#8217;s remains the most controversial Tuareg leader. He is the decision-making authority in an Islamic emirate based in the Azawad region which has persisted for more than ten months. Mr. Salehi feels that Ag Ghali has succeeded in frustrating Western analysts during this time period by evading their attempts to label him a terrorist.
Mr. Salehi concluded: &#8220;Iyad Ag Ghali has embarrassed Western analysts due to the fact that no Westerners have been abducted in the areas under his control. In fact he returned a Swiss-national and Spaniard to the authorities in Ouagadougou and Bamako after they had been abducted. He has also not targeted Western interests, and thus far he has not committed any transgressions that would allow these analysts to categorise him as a terrorist.&#8221;

</description> 
<pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<item>
<title>Shateri: Iran&#8217;s Regional Point Man</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32909</link>
<description>London, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;The killing of a senior Iranian commander west of Damascus highlights Tehran&#8217;s military involvement in the Syrian civil war. 
General Hassan Shateri is the highest ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer to be killed outside Iran. His death is likely to renew debate within the Tehran leadership regarding the future of the Assad regime. &#8220;Supreme Guide&#8221; Ali Khamenei has vowed to prevent Assad&#8217;s fall. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, has tried to distance Iran from Assad in the hope of preventing the emergence of a new anti-Iran bloc in the region.
Shateri, who was 58-years old, was gunned down as he was driving south to Beirut after a week of &#8220;consultations&#8221; with Syria&#8217;s military leaders.
The gun-battle, during which a Syrian military escort failed to protect the Iranian general, happened Monday. But it was only yesterday when Shateri was transferred to his native city of Semnan, east of Tehran, that the death was officially confirmed.
According to Tehran sources two of Shateri&#8217;s aides were also killed in the ambush set up by rebels fighting the Syrian despot Bashar Al-Assad.  It is not clear whether the aides were also Iranian or Lebanese from the local branch of Hezbollah. The official media in Tehran claims that the attackers were &#8220;agents of world Zionism&#8221;, a clich&#233; often used to point the finger at Israel for mishaps faced by Islamic officials.
The burial ceremony is scheduled for Friday with General Qassem Suleimani, Commander of the Quds (Jerusalem) Force heading the cortege.
The Quds Force, of which Shateri was a senior commander, is in charge of &#8220;exporting&#8221; the Islamic revolution. In practice, this means raising and leading pro-Iran militias and terrorist groups in countries of special interest to Tehran.
Shateri was sent to Lebanon after the mini-war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 to help rebuild the Iran-backed Shi&#8217;ite militia that had been shattered in the conflict. Shateri used the nom de guerre of Engineer Hessam Khosnevis with the title of &#8220;Special Representative of the President of the Islamic Republic&#8221; for the reconstruction in southern Lebanon where Shi&#8217;ites form a majority of the population.
According to Tehran sources, Shateri controlled several funds amounting to $200 million a year used to replace Hezbollah&#8217;s lost arsenal and rebuild its missile sites close to the demarcation line with Israel. He also launched a housing project that, over the past eight years, has helped over 600 Shi&#8217;ite families move into new homes.
As Special Representative of the IRGC, General Shateri sat on Hezbollah&#8217;s Central Command and helped shape the party&#8217;s policies with advice from Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
Shateri&#8217;s key achievement was the creation of an &#8220;inner-state&#8221; in Lebanon. This consists of a set of communication networks, using fibre optic systems, built in parallel with the ones controlled by the Lebanese government. Thus, Iran has its own telephone, television, and satellite communication facilities across the Lebanon. The general also launched a real estate company to buy land, sometimes whole villages, from Christian and Druze minorities. The chunks of real estate thus obtained helped Iran establish territorial contiguity between the Bekaa Valley, on the Syrian border, with Beirut and thence the demarcation line with Israel in the south. This has created a seamless Shi&#8217;ite-majority entity in the very heart of Lebanon.
The business empire controlled by Shateri in Lebanon includes banks, shopping malls, hotels, transport companies, radio and television networks, newspapers, and travel agencies.
The general became a star in Tehran when he succeeded in ousting the pro-West government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, replacing it with that of Najib Mikati with Hezbollah in effective control.
The anti-Assad uprising in Syria provided General Shateri with a new challenge. Over the past two years, he has helped recruit and train special units to fight for Assad. He brought in some 400 members of the IRGC from Iran to run the scheme with help from Lebanese Hezbollah fighters.
Shateri has also secured &#8220;mooring rights&#8221; for the IRGC&#8217;s navy in the Syrian port of Tartus where Iran is building military and civilian &#8220;facilities&#8221;.
It is not clear whether IRGC&#8217;s Iranian personnel have been directly involved in fighting against Syrian rebels. Tehran denies any involvement.  However, there is evidence that some of Shateri&#8217;s Lebanese men have died fighting for Assad in Syria. Anti-Assad forces claim that Iran and Hezbollah are both involved in Assad&#8217;s massacre of civilians in various parts of Syria.</description> 
<pubDate>Fri, 14 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: General People's Congress Party&#8217;s Hussein Hazib</title>
<link>http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&amp;id=32893</link>
<description>
Sanaa, Asharq Al-Awsat&#8212;A fierce debate currently rages in Yemen over whether or not former President Ali Abdullah Saleh should stay in his post as leader of the General People's Congress party [GPC], a partner in the national accord government. There is also controversy about his stay in the country as the date of the comprehensive national dialogue conference, scheduled for next month, is drawing near. In the following interview, Hussein Hazib, a leading member of the GPC party's General Committee, spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat about the issue of former President Saleh's presence in political life and leadership of the GPC party, and allegations about GPC collaboration with Yemen&#8217;s Huthis.
 [Asharq Al-Awsat] Have the nations sponsoring the GCC initiative on Yemen called on former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to give up his leadership of the GPC?
[Hazib] I would like to emphasize that the 10 nations that sponsor the GCC initiative have never broached this issue. They did not even mention it at our recent meeting with them. We notified them of interference by other parties in our party's internal affairs. They did not make any comment on the issue of Saleh's position. Reports on this issue are fabrications.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There has been much controversy about [former President] Saleh's presence in Yemen. Will he remain in the country? Will he take part in the national dialogue conference?
[Hazib] In fact, I am very surprised [at such questions]. Have people forgotten the rules of democratic politics? Like other political parties, the GPC believes that the issue of former President Saleh's presence in the GPC party's leadership is exclusively the jurisdiction of the GPC and its leaders. There is no problem over this issue; the problem lies in the interference of others in this issue.
 With regard to Saleh's participation in the comprehensive national dialogue, there is nothing in the provisions of the GCC's initiative on Yemen, which prevents him from participation in the national dialogue conference. The GPC selected its representatives to the comprehensive national dialogue conference and announced their names. Ali Abdullah Saleh and the GPC's leaders, like representatives of other political parties, will play their role in the conference and their points of reference will be the leaders of their political parties. We in the GPC have no problem whatsoever over the conference. The GPC is concerned about its leaders, and these are not Ali Abdullah Saleh alone or President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi alone, ours is a collective leadership. 
I believe that all leaders of the Joint Meeting Parties [JMP] and of the GPC should refrain from placing obstacles in the way of the comprehensive national dialogue conference. They should go to the conference to settle all issues at the conference and respect this country, which accepted them as creators of the crisis and now as the promoters of a solution. I underline that the basic points of reference of the GPC in any problem or discussion is the GCC initiative and its mechanism of implementation as well the UN Security Council resolutions. Our party will not deviate from these points of reference and will not accept any changes to them.
 [Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you agree that Former President Saleh was granted immunity in return for stepping down and leaving politics?
[Hazib] If there was a provision, or a hint in the documents, in the immunity law, or in the GCC initiative stating that former President Saleh was granted immunity as a quid pro quo for refraining from engaging in political action, we would be ready to expel him from the GPC party tomorrow morning. 
There are no such clauses and immunity was not solely granted to Saleh but to all parties. Those who currently rule the country have all benefited from the immunity.  Ali Abdullah Saleh accepted the settlement in order to live in his homeland for the rest of his life, not to leave it. I think that the issue over which there is or there is not disagreement is the GCC initiative and its provisions. 
If our political party or its leader Ali Abdullah Saleh shirks the implementation of the GCC initiative or some of its provisions, the world has the right to tell us we made a mistake. But giving up the GCC initiative and its provisions and setting new conditions would be a clear indication that they the (JMP) are bankrupt, beset by internal differences, and do not want the GCC initiative to run its course. They thus place hurdles in the GCC initiative's progress.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Did the GPC really threaten to withdraw from the national accord government, and if it did, why?
[Hazib] The GPC will not withdraw from the national accord government, and did not threaten to withdraw. The reports from media outlets about this are false. The GPC will not withdraw from the government because it knows that managing differences within the government is better than managing them from outside. 
However, the GPC may consider changing certain cabinet ministers who represent it in the government. This is possible and President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi may be asked to change certain ministers.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Some people say the GPC party is divided between those who support Saleh's stay as leader of the GPC, and those who call for the GPC's deputy leader, President Hadi, to take this role. Is this true?
[Hazib] Listen my dear brother, Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi are leaders of the GPC and no division will occur between them. It does not honor any GPC member to stand with Saleh against Hadi or stand with Hadi against Saleh. This does not do honor to them. Since they succeeded in resolving all the issues between them while working together since 1986 up to this day, they will certainly succeed again. For the GPC, division is not allowed, and if anyone seeks to divide us, we will reject them. We have by-laws that govern us. There are people who imagine that our party is like other political parties to which instructions are issued from above and they just oblige and implement their instructions.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What about the fact that the GPC Secretary General, Dr Abdul-Karim al-Iryani, has left Yemen for Cairo, where he lives in seclusion?
[Hazib] I do not think that President Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, or Abdul-Karim al-Iryani have complained of having any problem with the GPC. Al-Iryani said clearly that he left Yemen for respite from the JMP and their methods, particularly after the JMP slipped a statement into a meeting relating to the preparatory committee for the national dialogue. The JMP statement said that the dialogue committee achieved nothing. [Al-Iryani] submitted a report, on which all agreed, that he achieved all that was required and that what remained was to receive the names of the representatives of some parties to the national dialogue conference. 
We do not have serious disagreements, but perhaps there are differences of opinion, which are always settled by a majority of votes or by a member convincing another of his viewpoint.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Why did the UN Security Council delegation members ignore the GPC party during their recent visit to Sanaa?
[Hazib] The UN Security Council delegation did not come to Sanaa to meet with political parties. This shows some shortcomings on the part of those who prepared the visit. The UN delegation members met with state institutions. Leaders in the GMP made a statement at a meeting of the UN delegation with national dialogue committee members, who participated in the meeting as members of the committee, not in their capacity as party members. Those who prepared for the UN Security Council delegation's visit were supposed to prepare for a round table meeting and invite all the parties that signed the GCC initiative. I think that the UN envoy, Jamal Bin-Umar, should have submitted a report making clear what each Yemeni party had achieved. Prime Minister Muhammad Basindwa submitted a report that offended others, and he should take responsibility for it, because the report was absolutely not endorsed by the government.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Reports have emerged of disagreements between the GPC and the JMP. How would you describe the relationship between the two parties in the government??
[Hazib] We in the GPC face many wrongs like, for example, exclusion. To avoid upsetting Jamal Bin-Umar and what he represents, and because we are keen on a political settlement, our party overlooks many wrongs. Who, for instance, formulated the transitional justice draft law [over which there are differences in Yemen&#8217;s parliament]? Needless to say, the JMP did. They referred it to the government and differences arose over a certain point. It was referred to President Hadi in keeping with the GCC's initiative. The GPC kept silent about the draft law because it preceded the national dialogue conference and departed from the GCC's initiative. This draft law and the restructuring of the army are the outcome of national dialogue. Despite this, our party accepted what was decided to avoid the charge of obstructing a political settlement. We obliged although we knew that the JMP wanted to put the cart before the horse. If someone wants to enact a law on reconciliation, those involved should reconcile and agree on everything beforehand. But endorsement of such laws means that a particular party wants to put on record a particular political stance. We in the GPC always put the homeland's interest above our party's interest. President Hadi is not to blame, but his attention should be focused on certain issues.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] I sense from your answers that you feel that your party is unfairly treated by UN envoy Bin-Umar and by certain international parties.
[Hazib] Ask me why. We have had experiences with Bin-Umar and with the ambassadors of the sponsor states. If the GPC is slow in doing something, they raise hell and threaten sanctions. We noticed two things in the past 10 days: First, the JMP hinder the work of the national dialogue committee by delaying the nomination of their representatives to the committee, but no one raised an objection. Second, regarding the decision to restructure the Yemeni army, the party that did not implement the decision held more than one celebration, but again no one said anything. This is why we feel we are unfairly treated; it is a case of double standards. But we always think twice and say that the homeland is larger, and we do not want to add more burdens to President Hadi.  We rise above our concerns and overlook certain issues. This is evidence of double standards. We know what the GPC encountered when it was a little late in submitting some reports.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What is obstructing convening the national dialogue conference?
[Hazib] We know that everything is ready and all that is missing are the names of representatives of the political parties taking part. Regarding the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) and its participation in the conference, the UN Security Council made its stand clear. It said that those in the SMM who do not want to participate in the conference should not obstruct it. I would like to say that it is time that the GPC and the JMP met. It is shameful for the two parties that signed the GCC initiative to create problems and not seek to solve them, or personalize the solution. They should meet before the national dialogue conference and extend their hands to one another. I think there are issues on which we agree, notably the issue of Yemen's unity and addressing the south Yemen issue. There are no differences between us over these issues. Who will lead the GPC and the JMP if they do not make concessions to one another? They know that Yemenis always reach solutions. If they do not do that, they will go down in the black pages of history. The whole world comes to us and says that it is for Yemeni unity, peace, and dialogue. What we always do is come up with reports and say get this or that official out, and bring this or that in. We want the dialogue and a settlement to bring back [former south Yemen's presidents] Ali Salim al-Bid, and al-Attas along with their colleagues to their country. It is more appropriate to refrain from evicting officials from the country, primarily Ali Abdullah Saleh, who should only be called to account over the extent he implemented or hindered implementation of the GCC initiative. No solution in Yemen can work if any party feels unfairly treated. Absolutely no one should consider excluding others. Everyone, educated or uneducated, realizes that things would not move forward unless we are in harmony. President Hadi is working on his own on more than one level.
The media is biased the GPC. If the GPC does anything wrong, they raise hell, and if the GPC failed to submit the names of its representatives to the national dialogue committee, they would have requested implementation of measures under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter against it.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] As reporters, we report what happens in Yemen. After seven years of wars with the Huthis, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his political party seem to have become their allies.  Is this correct?
[Hazib] Those people who have allied themselves with the Huthis and have signed an agreement with them are the JMP. This took place in Cairo, but the political parties [involved] have said absolutely nothing about it. In the case of the GPC, I personally do not know of any alliance with the Huthis. Regarding the crowds that participated in the Prophet's Birthday anniversary, I know that if we invite them, only few would come. They did not even come to perform the Friday prayers with us at Al-Sab'in Square. Those who gathered are Huthis, not GPC members.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Have the Huthis become so powerful that they have a large presence in Sanaa?
[Hazib] Smart and well-organized people always succeed and thrive where the state is absent. The Huthis have become an important element in the equation and we have to admit that. We have to admit that the SMM has become an important element in the equation in Yemen also. All that the Huthis have to do is participate in the political process. After all, they are Yemenis. We now expect the Reform Party to ally itself with the Huthis as it allied itself with the Socialist Party, so the Huthis will not cause us a headache in the future. Had we had alliance with the Huthis, we would have announced it.    
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<pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
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