http://www.aawsat.com/english Asharq Alawsat English Edition is your insight into the Middle East en-us © 2012 Saudi Research and Publishing Wed, 26 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT 1 http://www.aawsat.com/english http://www.aawsat.com/english/images/aaaeng.gif 144 33 Asharq-e delivers up-to-the-minute news and information on the latest stories, weather, entertainment, politics in the Middle East http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=33003 We wondered whether Moaz Alkhatib, head of the Syrian National Coalition, was being shrewd or reckless with his call for dialogue with the Assad regime. Events today suggest that he was indeed shrewd, for the Assad regime has fallen into the trap of calling for a dialogue that it outright rejected in the past. Through the words of Walid Moallem in Moscow, Bashar Al-Assad is now begging for talks, even with the armed opposition. So what has changed for Assad to come forward now begging for dialogue with the opposition? It is clear that there are many factors, the most important of which being the advances of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on the ground, and its relentless persistence. Likewise, recent indicators have exposed blatant Iranian interference in Syria, alongside Hezbollah. The international community now fears the spread of terrorism because of Assad’s crimes and Iran’s interference, and this has finally prompted the world to act. It seems that the most important step in this regard has been, or will be, to allow the flow of quality weapons to the Syrian rebels, which was revealed recently by the Washington Post. Even though the newspaper did not announce who will actually be behind the supply of these weapons, it does not require a great deal of intelligence to work it out. What is more important is that armed reinforcement has now become a reality, and this will become apparent in the coming days. All this represents what I have always described as the only language Assad understands, namely the language of force and action, not words. This language will be consolidated further after the Rome conference, especially if Washington is serious, with US Secretary of State John Kerry going on record saying that he is coming to Rome for decisions on Syria, not simply to talk. All this is prompting Bashar Assad now to beg for dialogue with the opposition, even the armed elements such as the FSA which he formerly described as terrorists. Now we are even hearing Sergei Lavrov telling Moallem in Moscow that the Syrian opposition are wise, while in the past the entire revolution was being described as a terrorist movement by both Moscow and Assad. These developments are not the result of a sense of guilt on Assad’s part, or a sense of responsibility on the part of the Russians, rather they are the result of what is happening on the ground and the growing international momentum towards Syria. The Russians are aware that the new Obama administration has now been completed, and there are benefits between Washington and Moscow that the Russians cannot sacrifice in favor of Assad, especially as his regime is crumbling. This is not to mention the embarrassment suffered by Moscow after Khatib called for dialogue with Assad, who then manipulated the call as usual but now comes begging for dialogue after it is too late. Therefore, the most important thing in Syria today is to continue arming the FSA, and to begin developing the features of the post-Assad phase. This is a task for the Syrian opposition itself and not just the international community, which in turn must also not waste any more time and effort in alleged “dialogue” unless it is coupled with the announcement of Bashar Assad’s departure. Apart from the fact it is time wasting, it is giving Assad a chance he does not deserve. The Syrians have suffered enough over the past two years from Assad’s terrorism, and his regime is facing an outright collapse today. Wed, 26 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32999 Several politicians and analysts are trying to look closely and accurately into the state of confusion, tension, and failure that has characterized the experience of the ruling political groups and parties in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, ever since the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. Perhaps the most important and dangerous trait that all these political groups share is their "exclusionary" nature. They have failed to accommodate different segments of society and represent them all, particularly at a highly sensitive time following on from the violent and impassioned uprisings. These groups were once part of the opposition category themselves; practicing their activities in secret under the severe oppression of the previous regimes. As a result, once in power they took on a retaliatory form, further intensifying the state of fragmentation and fuelling mistrust within society. Islam’s discourse on politics in general is somewhat shallow. While we can find dozens of volumes and books on purity, worship, and other issues, there are very few books on "political fiqh", and a clear lack of scholarly consensus. This means that we must use much discretion when talking about political Islam; no one alone can claim a full understanding, and no one should be able to impose this understanding upon others. The “political Islam” groups that have come to power in the Arab Spring states have not followed in the footsteps of the Prophet Mohammed himself—peace be upon him—when he conquered Mecca. After the conquest, and while the prophet's opponents were dreading his reaction, Mohammed announced a "day of mercy" and uttered his famous saying "Even he who enters the house of Abu Sufyan will be safe ", in reference to his prominent opponent at the time. The prophet added “Go your way, for you are free ", without punishing or taking revenge against anyone. This principle was later applied by two of the most renowned politicians of the twentieth century: Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi and the peerless South African Nelson Mandela. They both offered a full pardon to their former opponents and enemies, and even incorporated them into their new regimes to become part of the solution, rather than the problem. This is the difference between wisdom and political maturity on the one hand, and political adolescence on the other. When one chooses to represent religion in the political domain, he must entail a greater moral responsibility because a huge amount of harm can be caused by his failure. Numerous examples of this can be seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, with a prevailing atmosphere of disappointment and frustration. Rachid Ghannouchi and his Ennahda party could have risen above selfishness and arrogance by agreeing to assist Hamadi Jebali in forming a non-partisan government—in order to administer the country's affairs in these hard times—without considering Jebali’s initiative as an attack or an affront. How could it be an attack, when Jebali himself represents the ruling party? However, the Ennahda party continued to adopt a policy of exclusion and bullying. The same applies to what is happening now in Egypt under President Mursi's government, with Prime Minister Hisham Qandil. A large section of the Egyptian people unanimously believe that Qandil has failed to manage the country's affairs, and also that the position of prime minister requires someone of greater expertise. Furthermore, they believe his incompetent handling of the economic situation could prove the biggest danger of all. Nevertheless, the man continues to cling to his position out of "stubbornness and arrogance", ignoring the demands of many Egyptians and describing them as a mob or corrupt remnants. In reality, this behavior is reminiscent of the style adopted by the very regimes the Arab Spring revolutions rose against in the first place. Prophet Mohammed’s approach is a far cry from those who currently claim to be following in his footsteps in the name of political Islam. Mohammed did not advocate revenge, slander or suspicion, nor did he label others as traitors. Yet modern-day political Islam continues to generate social ills such as division and sedition, and this situation is exacerbated by specific groups claiming the exclusive right to speak, understand, and judge in the name of religion. The cost of this will not be paid by the current governments or regimes; it is the generations to come who will truly suffer. Islamic groups came to power through democratic polls, but democracy has other fundamental criteria such as respecting the rights of all citizens and promoting justice, equality, and national unity. These principles seem completely alien to those in power today, and as a result the political Islam experience seems doomed to failure. Tue, 25 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32996 The issue of extremist groups in the Syrian revolution has become like a problematic ailment where the patient avoids discovering the extent of its severity, and declines to begin the treatment phase. In fact, he avoids even talking about it or being reminded of it. Yet two years on from the outbreak of the brave Syrian revolution, its power centers have effectively been divided in two; the political opposition based abroad and the revolutionary opposition on the ground. This is a very complex issue and we must talk about it openly. I realize that in the current phase of conflict against the Assad regime and its fierce ally Iran, the focus has been on uniting all arrows in the direction of this sectarian duo in order to topple the regime and then break the back of Iranian influence in the region. However, this does not prevent us from taking two parallel tracks, one that supports the efforts of the revolution financially, militarily, and logistically, in order to achieve its objectives, and a second to examine the complex map of the Syrian opposition in all its guises, especially the extremist groups that adhere to Al-Qaeda or at least share ideological traits with it. This form of early treatment would greatly reduce the complexity of the transfer of power after the collapse of the Assad regime, with all indications on the ground suggesting that this collapse is inevitable, even if it takes a long time. We cannot grope around this issue, rather we must talk about it frankly and transparently and this stage. It is not right to skirt around “extremist” revolutionary elements that could pose a threat to the revolution itself after the fall of the regime. The Syrian revolution’s recent phase—with the military victories, the capturing of cities and airports, and the political achievements including international recognition for the Syrian opposition—resembles to a large extent the stage before the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan. One of the most prominent similarities between the two cases is the reluctance to address the issue of extremism, avoiding any talk about the deep contrasts between opposition factions while victories are being achieved and before the regime has fallen. In Afghanistan, those who warned of the potential dangers after the fall of the communist regime were considered weak and poisonous influences in the eyes of the Mujahedeen. They were accused of taking cheap shots at the Afghan jihad movement and undermining its achievements, and in some cases they were even labeled as traitors. However, with deep regret, the days following the fall of Kabul proved them right. The security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated—in terms of the number of victims and the massive destruction—until a “shining light” emerged in the form of the Taliban, exploiting the weariness of the Afghans and their dissatisfaction towards the Mujahedeen who had exhausted the country’s resources. Whether we like it or not, we can expect a difficult and very complicated situation in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. It is no exaggeration to say that the map of the Syrian revolution is more complicated than the Afghani jihad of the 1980s. In the latter case, Islamic factions formed the overwhelming proportion of the Afghan opposition, whereas in the Syrian case there are liberal forces influencing the political scene, while the revolutionary forces on the ground are formed mainly of Islamic factions with diverse ideologies. Within these factions, some do not even recognize other armed revolutionary movements, so how do they view the political opposition, in which both liberals and secularists are active? Tue, 25 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32991 Renowned television writer Dr. Walid Saif has an interesting tale of the time the famous Arab director Tawfiq Saleh got in touch with him in Amman, and invited him to visit Baghdad. At the time, Saif did not question the reason for the visit, nor did Saleh explain it over the phone. When the playwright arrived in Iraq from Jordan, the director said, “I'm in trouble with President Saddam Hussein, and you are the only one who can help me." Before they caused a scene in the hotel reception, Tawfiq Saleh hastened to reassure his guest. He told him that he had recently directed a documentary about the life of Saddam Hussein, in which the president’s son-in-law (who was later assassinated) played the hero. In one particular scene, the film depicted Saddam's injury from a gunshot wound to the leg, as he tried to escape following the attempted assassination of Abd Al-Karim Qasim. In the scene, the Iraqi president appeared to be in slight discomfort as a local barber who had come to his aid was trying to pull the bullet from his leg. The film was privately screened for Saddam Hussein’s approval, and Tawfiq Saleh was immediately summoned to the presidential palace. Upon arrival, Tawfiq had to wait until the president sent for him, at which point he was introduced to an old humpbacked man, shivering out of fear. It was the same barber who had pulled the bullet out of the president's leg during his days as a young conspirator. Addressing the barber, Saddam asked, "When you pulled the bullet from my leg, did I feel any pain?" The barber responded, "Not at all sir, it was me who felt discomfort." Again, Saddam asked the barber, "Having pulled out the bullet, did I sweat?" The old man replied, "Not at all sir, only I did”. And with that, the president dismissed the barber, leaving him alone with Tawfiq Saleh. Saddam addressed Saleh, demanding, "How could it ever cross your mind to portray me suffering? Did you not learn anything from the Al-Khansaa television series?" Saleh responded, "Your word is my command sir". After the meeting, Saleh promptly got in touch with his friend Walid Saif, who had previously directed Al-Khansaa. He needed to know how to modify the shot and remove the look of pain from the president's face, for Saddam would never suffer, even if hit by a bullet. Saif suggested that the scene be re-shot in a way that does not show the president’s expression at all, as the film was already in post-production. The prominent Kuwaiti businessman Abdul Aziz Al-Babtain told me that he had once visited Saddam Hussein in his office, where they heard a huge explosion, but Saddam remained unperturbed. The then Iraqi president simply gazed at Al-Babtain and asked, "Do you think Abdul-Nasser would have remained so calm had an explosion taken place so near to him?" In the final moments of his life, approaching the gallows, Saddam Hussein still remained composed. He never flinched, nor did his voice tremble, as the noose was placed around his neck. So was this trait something we should admire? In my opinion, I would prefer a president who is merciful rather than brave. I would prefer a president whose expression instills reassurance rather than terror, a president who is tolerant with his opponents, and who does not order their execution. I do not believe it is courageous to never forgive, or to condemn those who disagree with you to jail, exile, or death. Courage is not represented by the ability to never flinch; rather it is the ability to promote justice, forgiveness, and mercy. Mon, 24 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32988 The Syrian Opposition Coalition has announced the suspension of its planned visits to both Washington and Moscow, and likewise its withdrawal from participating in the upcoming Friends of Syria conference in Rome, in protest against the “international silence” towards the crimes committed against the Syrians, after the Assad regime once again bombarded Aleppo with long-range missiles. However, a boycott is the wrong course of action to take. Boycotts are not the solution for the Syrian opposition, whatever the justifications, for the basic principle in politics is communication, even if through covert channels. The Syrian opposition desperately need to connect themselves with the international community, both Russia and the West, rather than having intermediaries speaking on their behalf, whether Arab or Western. It is true that the international stance is languid and frustrating, but what exactly is the alternative especially considering that Iran, for example, is providing alarming continuous support for Bashar al-Assad? Therefore, emotional boycotts are not prudent, for the opposition must visit Moscow and Washington, explain their position, and tirelessly try to mobilize international stances in their favor. Otherwise, the only beneficiary is Bashar Assad, who has relentlessly tried, since the outbreak of the revolution, to discredit the opposition and fragment it. Assad has done everything possible in order to achieve this, so why should the opposition give him his desired result on a silver platter, especially at a time when it is even more pressing to talk about the situation in Syria and the need for intervention? The US administration is facing mounting internal criticism about its stance towards the Syrian revolution, and even some American journalists known for their defense of the Obama administration are now talking about Syria in critical, or at least objective, language. Talk is largely focusing on calls to review the US position, especially with the completed formation of the new US administration, and this makes the idea of a boycott even more illogical. Consider the recent article written in the London Review of Books, carried by Reuters, which quoted a White House official saying that the US administration is trying to learn from past lessons, especially Iraq. The official said, “The United States has a long history of picking winners and losers based on the guy who speaks English well . . . It’s just trying to learn the lessons and be humble.” This means that the Syrian opposition must communicate in order to convince and change attitudes, even if it seems frustrating. With regards to connecting with the Russians, Russia’s manipulative and contradictory statements merit an outright confrontation with Moscow itself. This is not necessarily to convince the Russians, but to expose them internationally, for there must be some form of political challenge and refutation of their arguments. It is true that the crimes committed in Syria say it all, but merely communicating with the Russians—from the Syrian opposition perspective—will embarrass them politically, and embarrass Assad himself, who has tried endless tricks to strike the opposition and thwart their communication with the international community. The opposition’s boycott is a breakthrough for Assad, even if only in front of his narrow circle of support, and this is what the Syrian opposition must avoid. Unfortunately, the Syrian opposition’s fate for the time being has been reduced to explaining the obvious, but as the Arabs say, part of the problem lies in explaining the obvious. Mon, 24 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32986 Everyone I’ve met has tried to make excuses for Sheikh Moaz Al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition, ever since he attempted to swim against the opposition tide by calling for negotiations with the regime, on favorable terms. However, as was to be expected, the regime has responded by manipulating both Khatib and his initiative. Some have claimed Khatib simply wanted to satisfy the countries insisting on pursuing a peaceful solution, while others believed Khatib actually wanted to embarrass the regime. Some thought Khatib, as the newly appointed leader of the coalition, wanted to present a different image of the opposition away from the killing and fighting, in order to reinforce its multi-dimensional nature. Others suspected that Khatib only launched his negotiations initiative due to pressure from certain funding countries; countries that in turn were under pressure themselves because of their silence and hesitance. So what is actually wrong with going down the political path and seeking to engage in peaceful negotiations? In theory, nothing, but this approach can only be adopted in one of the following two cases: The first is that the rebels have become convinced that their project for change has failed, and that the revolution has reached a dead end, and thus they will try to cut their losses as much as possible in exchange for surrendering their weapons. However, this is not true. Although the conflict has been ongoing for many months and although the regime is still standing, the opposition fighters are still making progress. The second case is that fighters on the ground have actually made great strides in the process of overthrowing the regime, and now they believe the bloodshed can come to an end as the regime is ready to leave power under reasonable conditions. But this is also not true because the regime is still fighting, and it still controls several important areas. I believe, as do many of his sympathizers, that Khatib’s intention was to embarrass the Syrian regime by presenting a political initiative that he knew Assad would turn down. This would also embarrass the Russians in particular, who have been calling for dialogue for over a year. Of course, it was a maneuver and not a frank proposal. But it was a maneuver against a regime that has mastered the art over the past 40 years. We must also not forget that Iran, the regime’s main ally, has been maneuvering against the West with regards to negotiations on its nuclear program by procrastinating and making empty promises. Furthermore, Assad manipulated the Lebanese for years and has betrayed almost all countries in the region. So what experience does the opposition leader have to enter such as wrestling ring? And just look how Assad responded! He waited for Khatib’s specified deadline to pass and then responded a day later. This was the beginning of Assad’s maneuvers. He wanted to turn the tables on the opposition and so he presented a proposal that was even better: The Syrian minister of information addressed the opposition asking them to return to Damascus, guaranteeing their safety. He called on them to negotiate with the regime in any manner they wished, and if they disliked the outcomes they could leave at any time without the threat of judicial or security pursuit. Assad was clearly trying to call Khatib’s bluff and embarrass the opposition in front of the world. In this regard, he has many more cards to play. For example, he could release thousands of detainees in exchange for nothing, just to show he has good intentions, or he could issue passports to some opposition figures. What would Sheikh Moaz do then? Would he go to negotiate? If he did, he would divide the opposition and disrupt any revolutionary momentum. The rebels would immediately think that their coalition had abandoned them and that countries supporting them had sold them out. However, if Khatib rejected the offer to negotiate, he would look like an amateur bluffer in front of the world’s superpowers. There are currently more questions than answers, but let us consider the following: Is there any factor within the opposition or on the battlefield at present to imply that Assad is really ready to commit to a peaceful solution and end his rule? This is inconceivable. Therefore, everyone must realize that it is not yet time for a peaceful solution. The revolution has not been defeated and the regime will not fall within a matter of days. The opposition must redouble their efforts to support the rebels on the ground and unite their leaderships. They must also insist on a military solution because despite the bloodshed, this is the only way to limit further suffering. Whatever Moaz Khatib and his supporters think, it is no longer possible for the Syrian regime to remain in power in any form, given the deep hatred entrenched among millions of Syrians. Mon, 24 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32979 In Tunisia, the press reports that there is a significant difference of opinion between Hamadi Jebali, “star” of Ennahda, and the party’s founder and leader Rachid Ghannouchi. This dispute, regarding the approach to governing, has reached an impasse after Jebali’s initiative to form a “technocrat” government to replace the authoritarian Ennahda-dominated government was blocked. “Sheikh” Rachid Ghannouchi stubbornly rejected this proposal, frankly stating that “we will not leave power.” Jebali, angered by Ghannouchi’s frighteningly authoritarian stance, submitted his resignation as prime minister, and some now believe that he intends to establish a new Islamist political party, one with a more liberal and flexible approach than Ennahda. Before Jebali there was Sheikh Abdel Fattah Mourou, who served as Ennahda’s counterbalance to Ghannouchi. He previously called on Ghannouchi to step down as party leader in order to save the Islamist movement. However Mourou later retracted this statement after Ghannouchi publicly praised him, although we don’t know what the Ennahda leader said to him behind closed doors to convince him to soften his position. These events bear a resemblance to some previous developments in Egypt, where Rifaq Abu Al-Alaa followed the same path as Essam Sultan and Mohamed Mahsoub and others, and left the embrace of the mother Muslim Brotherhood organization to craft a political platform of their own. The entrance of these figures into the political arena as independents was said to be at the behest of the Brotherhood itself, and at the initiative of the organization’s younger members at that. However the Muslim Brotherhood later rejected these political platforms, leading the youth to form their own party in 1996. However, the government’s political commission refused to recognize this political party, and this became a high-profile case in Egypt, particularly as the party applied for a political license on three separate occasions and met with refusal each time. The party was eventually able to officially register itself following the ouster of the Mubarak regime in 2011 under the name Hizb Al-Wasat Al-Jadid otherwise known as the Wasat (moderate) Party. Around this time, affiliation to the Wasat Party, or merely communicating with it, was grounds for expulsion from the Muslim Brotherhood organization, despite its similar ideological, educational, and political activist model. Recently, following the so-called Arab Spring in Egypt, senior Muslim Brotherhood figure Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh took the decision to run for president, against the wishes of the mother organization. He therefore jumped, or was pushed, out of the Brotherhood and formed his own political party, increasing the number of his followers and supporters. Today, he continues to attempt to promote himself as a moderate alternative to the Brotherhood, as an Islamist with a liberal and nationalist flavor. These are the most prominent Egyptian cases, but there are many trying either to jump ship from the Brotherhood, or win over some of the organization’s support base by competing with it over religious slogans, particularly following the Brotherhood’s missteps after taking power. In fact there are some Egyptian parties who are seeking to take the Brotherhood’s place, particularly in terms of the organization’s primary activities of Islamic Dawa (Call) and discourse, away from direct political action. This is what former Brotherhood leadership figure Kamal El-Helbawi, and former Brotherhood Deputy General Guide Mohamed Habib are currently trying to do. Note that we are only talking about defections from the Brotherhood organization, rather than ideology or approach that it embraces. The Muslim Brotherhood is not the only organization that utilizes religious slogans for political mobilization and to attract the general public. There are other groups such as the Salafi political groups and Hizb ut-Tahrir that are urgently calling for the establishment of a caliphate. There are also divisions and differences of opinion within each trend that sometimes reach the point of violence and even the exchange of accusations of treason. It is sufficient to read what the Salafists say about the Muslim Brotherhood and what the Brotherhood say about the Salafists, not to mention what Hizb ut-Tahrir say about them both, to see the ferocity of these disputes. The question that is raised here is: Which of the above represents the “true” Islamic viewpoint? Speaking for myself, they are all mere mortals and nobody has a monopoly on the divine, regardless of what slogans one shouts. The deciding factor is evidence, the results on the ground, and how this benefits the people, rather than physical manifestations of religiosity and the repetition of the same tired speeches and sermons. Sun, 23 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32970 Ever since human societies developed systems of government the exercise of power has depended on two factors: persuasion and coercion. Persuasion is needed to encourage subjects or, in more modern societies, citizens, to do the things that government wants them to do. When persuasion fails, coercion may be needed to obtain the desired results. Governments also resort to coercion to deal with threats to law and order. As a rule, governments in the more developed and stable societies depend on persuasion, seldom using their theoretical monopoly or the use of violence as a political instrument. The politics of persuasion, however, requires a great deal of hard work. One has to constantly listen to any Tom, Dick and Harry. A great deal of time is spent on election campaigns with the inevitable rounds of hugging grandmas and kissing babies. Politics of persuasion helps create an atmosphere of freedom and that, in turn, nurtures security. When coercion is the chief instrument of government there is little freedom and even less security. This is what is happening in the Islamic Republic created by the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The wave of arrests launched against journalists, academics, and human rights activists is fomenting an unprecedented sense of insecurity. “Today, no one feels secure,” says Abdullah Nuri, a mullah and a former Minister of the Interior who also served as Khomeini’s Special representative in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Nuri, was speaking about the raids carried out at night on the homes of two of the daughters of former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi. The two ladies were held for several days while their homes were ransacked by security men looking for “anti-state material.” Needless to say, Mousavi has been under house arrest for the past two years along with his wife Zahra. Nuri knows what he is talking about. He spent five years in prison on charges of “undermining national security” because he criticized certain aspects of government policy in the 1990s. Using insecurity as a weapon of intimidation, the regime has tried to silence other actual or potential critics. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has been forced to make a deal under which he would say nice things about “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei. In exchange, Rafsanjani’s son, Mehdi, was released from prison on bail pending his trial on charges of anti-state activities. Rafsanjani’s daughter Fa’ezeh remains in prison on similar charges. Another former president, Muhammad Khatami, also a mullah, has been silenced by having his passport withdrawn, becoming a virtual hostage in Iran. Insecurity could affect anyone. Khamenei has had to cancel two provincial visits after warnings that he might face angry crowds. For his part President Ahmadinejad has also dropped a long-advertised visit to the southern provinces because of similar concerns. The fear is not theoretical. Last month a number of regime grandees had to stop making speeches when they faced angry crowds. In Qom, Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Islamic Majlis, the ersatz parliament, was whisked to safety by his bodyguards as protestors tried to drown out his speech. Larijani’s predecessor as Majlis Speaker, Ali-Akbar Nateq Nuri, yet another mullah, cancelled a speech in Mash’had after his bodyguards told him he might be molested by protestors. A third mullah, Hassan Khomeini, a grandson of the regime’s founder, had a similar experience, fleeing from an angry crowd. All those incidents happened during the traditional 10-day celebration of Khomeini’s seizure of power in 1979. But who were the protestors who tried to disturb the revolutionary festivities? Because the protests affected members of all rival factions within the Khomeinist elite, one may conclude that the target was the regime as a whole. There is no doubt that economic meltdown, the spectacle of Khomeinist infighting and fears about the future have generated a great deal of anger across the nation. However, it is also possible that the intimidation tactics that forced regime grandees to run for cover may have been the work of rival factions. Larijani’s friends claim that his humiliation in Qom, of which he is the Majlis member, was the work of Ahmadinejad’s faction. Ahmadinejad blames his decision to cancel provincial trips on Larijani’s scheme to take revenge against him by sending a rent-a-mob to disturb presidential rallies. Regardless of which faction they belong to, leading members of the Khomeinist elite have developed what one might call the Ceausescu syndrome. Nicolae Ceausescu was Romania’s seemingly eternal Communist ruler until 1989 when he was booed out of office and out of history by an angry crowd in Bucharest. In one of those ironies of history, Ceausescu met his end just 48 hours after returning from a visit to Tehran where he had concluded a “strategic partnership” with the Khomeinist regime. We now know that the angry crowd that revealed the nakedness of the emperor had been organized by Ceausescu’s rivals within the Communist hierarchy. Those rivals had hoped to drive the old dictator out while preserving the regime for themselves. More recently, we have witnessed a new version of the syndrome in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt where the old weapon of insecurity, used for years against critics and opponents, turned against the despots in place. In the final analysis, in a system based on insecurity no one is secure. The same crowd that hailed the despot on his triumphal march could boo him out with a vengeance. Sat, 22 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32973 If an observer were to take a look at our region, he would find that we are face to face with mounting evidence of the “Shia Al-Qaeda”—otherwise known as Hezbollah—in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as in the Gulf States, most notably Bahrain, and even in Libya and North Africa. Iran’s adherent groups are acting along the same lines as the Sunni Al-Qaeda; seeking to cement a presence in the region’s hot-spots and apply the Hezbollah model there. The Shia Al-Qaeda is drawing its inspiration from Hezbollah’s experience in Lebanon and applying it to Yemen, via the Houthis, with the aim of creating a front against Saudi Arabia and, of course, the entire Gulf region. Similarly, in Iraq, the Shia Asaib Ahl Al-Haq—an adherent of Iran that has carried out killings and bloodshed—has entered the political arena with the aim of undermining the Sadrist movement and consolidating Nuri Al-Maliki’s stance. This is reminiscent of Hezbollah’s endeavors to hijack the Shiite leadership in Lebanon from the Amal Movement there. In Bahrain, armed terrorist militias are being formed while the Shia Wefaq movement continues to work under a civil guise, seeking to penetrate Western institutions along the lines of Hezbollah by using an armed wing and a political one. It is ironic that this is all happening at a time when the West is currently considering imposing sanctions on Hezbollah, in both its military and political forms. In Syria, the situation is even uglier. Now we see the Free Syrian Army (FSA) giving an ultimatum to Hezbollah, threatening to target its sites. Hezbollah, alongside the Iranian Quds Force, are seeking to quell the Syrian popular revolution and protect Bashar Al-Assad, or at least ensure that Hezbollah and Iran have a foothold in the post-Assad era. In order for Hezbollah to accomplish this objective, they are trying to form an affiliate party there. In a similar manner to Hezbollah, this party will later on base its legitimacy on the premise of targeting Israel from the Golan Heights, and thus any affront against it would be akin to defending Israel. Furthermore, this all is happening under Iranian auspices. In spite of the crimes of his group, and up until around 2004, Osama Bin Laden was known as “Sheikh”. Similarly, in the Shiite case, some continue to refer to Hassan Nasrallah as “Sayyid” (an honorific title in Shia Islam). As for Iran’s agents who adhere to Hezbollah, they are not only infiltrating the Arab media or Arab parliaments, but also Western research centers that continue to promote them in a naïve manner, similar to how Al-Jazeera promoted Al-Qaeda in the late 1990s. What is most frustrating about the story of the Shia Al-Qaeda—Hezbollah—in our region is not the Western ignorance of it, but rather the silence of rational Shiites, even as Iran trades on their issues and causes. It is odd for some to argue, for example, that Israel is seeking to provoke sectarian strife in the region, when the question that should be raised is: Why is Iran allowed to exploit the region’s Shiites to accomplish Israel’s objectives? Aren’t there any rational Shiites willing to challenge this, particularly considering the unforgivable crimes Hezbollah and Iran are committing in Syria? Therefore, it is important to heed the warnings about the spread of the Shia Al-Qaeda in our region, for it is no less dangerous than its Sunni counterpart. Sat, 22 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=32963 In some dictionaries, the word "conservative," when applied to a country, has referred to a hardline state that is skeptical about attempts to promote tolerance in religious discourse, open societies, and rapprochement with neighboring states. Such a description is often applied to Iran, particularly after the1979 revolution, though features of a conservative state were always apparent in all elements of the country. Yet with the passage of time, Iran's policy began to present us with a new interpretation of the concept, especially in regards to its relations with Arab states. Iran used to consider that Shatt al-Arab as part of its territory, one that Iraq had no claim to, and so Iran was in a prolonged dispute with the Saddam Hussein regime over that district. Yet this ended in a tragicomic manner after Khomeini ceased the war against Saddam, describing his [Khomeini's] acceptance of the decision to accept a ceasefire as akin to drinking poison. Iran also claimed the Emirate islands that it occupied and annexed to its own provinces. Of course, from time to time, it happens that an Iranian MP, a military figure or a media representative comes out and makes a "slip of the tongue" and says that Bahrain is an Iranian province that should return to the Iranian fold and that Iran will not rest until this is achieved. Then an official would come out and say that this official was not speaking on behalf of the Iranian government, meaning not that what was said was objectionable, but that it was not official policy. Recently, an Iranian scholar stated that Syria is an Iranian province whose importance far exceeds numerous other Iranian provinces and that defending it is a question of life or death. This scholar must view the situation from an abhorrent sectarian perspective that allows killings and encourage foreign intervention using all means, and ways possible, including the assistance of troops from Iran’s Quds Force (the foreign operations wing of the Revolutionary Guard). Today, this force is assisting government military operations in Syria, alongside special troops assisted by the Lebanese Hezbollah's militias and the Iraqi Badr Force. All these statements and slips of the tongue are succeeded by military adventures, a practical embodiment of the idea of exporting the revolution. It is no longer possible to view such Iranian statements as mere slips of the tongue or as personal opinions. This was clearly reflected by the statements which Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar, Dr. Ahmed al-Tayed, issued following his meeting with Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his recent visit to Cairo. President Ahmadinejad provoked the sentiments of the Egyptian people when visiting the shrines of Ahl al-Bayt (the family of Prophet Mohamed), something neither Iran nor the followers of the Jafari school of thought recognize. The Jafari school of thought does not recognize the historical fact that the head of al-Hussein (Prophet Mohamed's grandson) exists in Egypt, while they believe it rests in Damascus. Nor does the Jafari school recognize the presence of the remains of Zaynab bin Ali (Prophet Mohamed's grand-daughter) in Egypt, but believe her body is buried in Damascus. So, what was Ahmadinejad visiting then? This, however, emphasizes that the purpose of the visit was mere provocation, something the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar realized, leading him to warn Iran against attempts to intervene in the Arab world or of trying to play with people's religious feelings and symbols. Ahmadinejad does not seem to have understood the message. Fri, 21 Feb 2013 13:43:12 GMT